

TRUSTING TRUST REVISITED

Preventing Software Supply Chain Attacks
Using Modern Methods

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~ 18 000 customers^[7]

SolarWinds 2020

> 500 million users^[1]


XcodeGhost 2015

> 100 000 users^[2]

Win32/Induc 2009

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The Attack




```
inject = 'inject = %c%s%c  
if source contains "compile()":  
    prepend("compile()", inject % 34, inject, 34)'  
  
if source contains "compile()":  
    prepend("compile()", inject % 34, inject, 34)  
  
compile()
```

[3] McKeeman, Horning und Wortman: *A Compiler Generator* 1970


[6] Thompson: „Reflections on Trusting Trust“ 1984

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Diverse Double Compiling



Reproducible



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CHAINIAC

Developers



Cothority



Timeline



Mirror




[4] Nikitin u.a.: „CHAINIAC: Proactive Software-Update Transparency via Collectively Signed Skipchains and Verified Builds“
2017

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Conclusion

- > Reproducible Builds
- > Tool support



- > **Trusting Trust**

